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Abstract: This paper proposes a methodology for host-based 
anomaly detection using a semi-supervised algorithm namely 
one-class classifier combined with a PCA-based feature 
extraction technique called Eigentraces on system call trace data. 
The one-class classification is based on generating a set of 
artificial data using a reference distribution and combining the 
target class probability function with artificial class density 
function to estimate the target class density function through the 
Bayes formulation. The benchmark dataset, ADFA-LD, is 
employed for the simulation study. ADFA-LD dataset contains 
thousands of system call traces collected during various normal 
and attack processes for the Linux operating system 
environment. In order to pre-process and to extract features, 
windowing on the system call trace data followed by the principal 
component analysis which is named as Eigentraces is 
implemented. The target class probability function is modeled 
separately by Radial Basis Function neural network and 
Random Forest machine learners for performance comparison 
purposes. The simulation study showed that the proposed 
intrusion detection system offers high performance for detecting 
anomalies and normal activities with respect to a set of well-
accepted metrics including detection rate, accuracy, and missed 
and false alarm rates. 
 
Keywords: one-class classification, PCA, intrusion detection, 
host-based, system call trace data, random forest ensemble, radial 
basis function neural network.  
 
I. Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) is an active research field 
due to an acute and urgent need for cybersecurity techniques 
against constantly evolving attacks on the computing 
infrastructures globally. The cyber threats are categorized into 
two different types: known attacks for which a so-called 
signature is available and unknown attacks which were never 
seen before. Dealing with known attacks is much more 
straightforward since there are many references providing 
useful information about their traits and patterns. However, 
for unknown attacks there is no such signature: all that is 
known is that it does not belong to the normal mode of 
operation given the existing model, profile or signature of 
what constitutes “normal” or known attack signatures.  
Machine learning techniques offer a host of options to 
process raw data for clustering or classification and can be 
employed effectively to detect intrusions.  Intrusion detection 
systems for anomalous circumstances can be implemented by 
either semi-supervised techniques when labeled data for one 
class (usually normal class) for training exist and 
unsupervised learning for the case when there is no labeled 
data. According to [1], many factors make the anomaly 
detection procedure challenging. Defining an exact and 
precise boundary for the normal (target) class is one 
significant reason. In many domains, the normal behavior 
continually evolves as do the attacks and today’s outlook often 
may not be a proper representation of future behavior. 
Moreover, in some cases, the anomalous tracepoint close to 
the normal boundary will be considered as a safe behavior. 
The adversaries that impose anomalous behavior on the 
system will try to adapt themselves to project a behavior as if 
it belonged to normal activity, which makes the detection 
process much more difficult. In most machine learning-based 
approaches for supervised classification, the availability of 
labeled data for both training and testing is necessary while 
for anomaly detection that is a major constraining issue.  
There are numerous techniques reported in the literature for 
anomaly detection. Tavallaee et al. [2] compiled a 
comprehensive survey of anomaly-based intrusion detection 
studies. They have considered 276 articles in this area and 
reported that 160 of them employed classification-based 
methods; 62 of them proposed statistics-based techniques; 36 
papers presented clustering approaches, and 46 studies 
utilized miscellaneous or hybrid methods. Another dimension 
for anomaly detection is the context for environment and 
execution: it can be based on host data, network traffic data or 
the combination of both host data and network traffic data.   
Following paragraphs will discuss recent work on host-based 
anomaly detection studies reported in the literature as that is 
the focus and scope of our study to be presented in this paper. 
Deshpande et al. [3] proposed a host-based anomaly-detection 
system model for cloud computing environment which alerts 
cloud users against intrusions within their system by analyzing 
the system call traces. In their study, the process ID, system 
calls, and their frequencies have been extracted from log 
records which were collected by the Linux OS audit 
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framework. They stored the frequency of normal system calls 
into a “normal” records database. For any new system call 
trace converted to a frequency vector, their system compares 
it with the vectors in the “normal” database using the 
Euclidean distance. Utilizing the datasets used in [4] and [5], 
their study reports 96% accuracy in detecting malicious 
activities.  
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) is one of the most 
common attacks in cloud environments. Although software-
defined networking (SDN) provides various capabilities to 
prevent and mitigate DDoS attacks, they have several 
vulnerabilities [6] that can be exploited. Mahrach et al. [7] 
proposed a method to protect the cloud environment against 
SYN flooding attack at the switch level by detecting traffic 
anomalies and performing a SYN cookie technique. This 
study monitors the mean of a process based on the samples 
collected from that process during a particular period of time 
and triggers an alarm when the accumulated volume of 
measurements exceeds a threshold.  
In a host-based misuse intrusion detection system study, 
Aghaei et al.[8] generated the most frequent unique N-gram 
features from system call traces of benign and different attack 
classes in the ADFA-LD dataset. To reduce the effect of noise, 
they also extracted the most frequent N-gram patterns 
regardless of their uniqueness according to their occurrence 
frequencies and resampled the training set using SMOTE 
technique to overcome the imbalanced data problem. 
Leveraging an ensemble learning model using five different 
classifiers including naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, 
PART, Decision Tree, and Random Forest, they created two 
different classification models. These were a binary 
classification model to detect attacks and a multiclass 
classification model to detect the type of attacks. They report 
99.9% accuracy and 0.6% false positive rate for binary 
classification. However, the multiclass classifier performance 
was relatively poor as it failed to detect the attack type and 
only scored the average accuracy of 55% for all attack classes. 
In another host-based misuse intrusion detection study on 
the ADFA-LD dataset, Serpen et al.[9], generated fixed-size 
feature vectors using a windowing technique. To reduce the 
dimensionality and to convert vectors in feature space into a 
set of linearly uncorrelated variables, they employed principal 
component analysis (PCA). To classify a new pattern, they 
leveraged the k-nearest neighbor algorithm using Euclidean 
distance to calculate its distance with the existing vectors 
generated during the training phase. They implemented both 
binary and multiclass classification models which had the 
same values for all performance metrics considered: their 
models achieved 99.9%, 0.2%, 100%, and 99.9% for 
accuracy, false positive rate, precision, and F1 score, 
respectively. 
Against the backdrop of this comprehensive research work 
that is currently ongoing, there is still a need to explore 
intrusion detection systems for anomalous patterns and 
processes in order to increase performance to minimize false 
alarms and missed alarms, but more importantly, to maximize 
the detection rate for the anomalies.  Consequently, in this 
study, we propose a host-based intrusion anomaly detection 
methodology, which draws upon techniques from principal 
component analysis, machine learning, and statistics. We 
employed a Linux-based dataset called ADFA-LD, which is a 
pool of system call traces during various normal and attack 
modes of operation [10-12]. This dataset contains thousands 
of traces during normal operation and six different attack 
types. The raw data of system call traces were preprocessed 
with the PCA-based feature extraction technique also called 
Eigentraces. Machine learning algorithms, Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) network and Random Forest, in conjunction 
with the Gaussian mixture models, were used to model 
probability distribution and density functions. Rendering a 
decision if a particular call trace pattern is anomalous or not 
employs the one-class classifier approach. 
 
II. Methodology 
In this section, we define the overall data preparation and 
classifier model generation procedure. In subsequent sections, 
we present a windowing technique to generate equal-size 
vectors from the ADFA-LD raw dataset. This is followed by 
a PCA-based technique for feature extraction to generate the 
training and testing datasets. In the following section, we 
present the theoretical foundations of the one-class 
classification methodology that combines the density function 
and class probability estimation approaches. We then model 
target class through a user-defined distribution function and 
generate artificial data from that reference distribution, which 
is associated with the label for the second (anomaly) class. We 
take advantage of two machine learning algorithms, namely 
Radial Basis Function neural network and Random Forest, for 
target class probability estimation (but not for prediction). In 
the succeeding step, using Bayes’ theorem, we estimate the 
target class density function, which is then utilized to decide 
if a newly encountered test pattern belongs to the target class 
or not. 
A. Pre-processing and feature extraction using windowing 
The ADFA-LD dataset comprises three major categories of 
data, namely TDM, VDM, and ADM. TDM and VDM 
represent the normal class that contains 833 and 4372 system 
call traces, respectively. The ADM represents 746 attack 
traces. In order to generate the training set, we use the TDM 
only and for the testing set, we combine VDM and TDM. 
The length of traces in ADFA-LD varies from 75 to 4494 
system call instances. To apply the PCA-based template 
generation (aka the Eigentraces) methodology on this dataset, 
all traces must be equalized in length. One option is to define 
a window of size d, 𝑑 ∈ 𝑍+, which slides over traces by a shift 
count or length s where s≤d. Thus, the windowing process 
generates trace files where their lengths are d system call 
numbers. One drawback of this method is that the length of a 
trace might be incompatible with the shift size for the very last 
window of a trace file. In other words, the shift size might be 
greater than the remaining trace length. In this case, we can 
add a constant number which is a dummy or non-existent 
system call number as many times as needed to the end of the 
trace. Here is an illustrated example. Suppose there is a 
sequence of numbers with a length of 10 as below: 
 
𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼5 𝛼6 𝛼7 𝛼8 𝛼9 𝛼10 
 
Consider sliding a window with size 6 (d = 6) to the right by 
shift length 5 (s = 5).  Each rolled window forms an input 
pattern: accordingly,  𝛼1 to  𝛼6  is such an input pattern as 
shown below:  
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that it will be necessary to assign a number to any cells 
in the final window, which are blank such as  𝛼11.  This 
needs to be done in a neutral manner. This number can be 
any value that is not a valid system call. For instance, if the 
range of numbers is between 1 and 100 for system calls for a 
given operating system, the number 0 can be added for the 
position 𝛼11.  Another option is to throw away the very last 
window of system call numbers if the window is not 
complete 
 For ADFA-LD, we have assigned, through an empirical 
process of exploration, 76 to the window size with 10 as the 
shift length or size since the minimum trace file size is 75 
system calls. In addition, we have used the value 0.1 to fill in 
the empty slots at the end of any window frame if the shift size 
is greater than the remaining length of a trace.  This procedure 
is performed to convert the traces with different lengths into a 
collection or set of vectors of 76 elements, which are stored in 
the columns of a matrix associated with each of normal and 
attack classes. Since this is the anomaly detection context, the 
training set contains labels only for the target class, which is 
also called the normal class. The testing set includes patterns 
belonging to the normal class and the attack class. Table 1 
shows the dimensions of training and testing matrices. 
 
 
 
B. PCA-based feature extraction for a sequence of system 
calls 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [13] uses a linear 
transformation to the maximal variation to find out principal 
components and to reduce the dimensionality of the data by 
identifying the direction of each principal vector, which is also 
called a principal component. The number of these 
components is much less than the number of variables. As a 
result, each original data instance vector can be represented by 
a smaller number of variables or features. This property makes 
the PCA a useful tool for analysis in high dimensional feature 
spaces.   
 To apply the PCA-based Eigentraces [14] methodology on 
the ADFA-LD system call trace data, we first form the data 
matrix  using the trace vectors ti with dimensions of 76×1, 
where i=1,2,…, M with M representing the number of trace 
vectors: 
D = [t1 : t2 : … : t𝑀]. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present the application of the Eigentraces 
methodology for training and testing procedures, 
respectively. 
 
Eigentraces Methodology: Generation of Training 
Template Set 
 
I. Form training data into a matrix for the normal class 
as follows.  Let ti represent the i
th trace of the normal 
class where each trace is a 76×1 column vector of 
integers; then the training data matrix is defined as 
follows: 
Dtrain = [t1 : t2: … : t25689], 
where there are 25689 traces belonging to the normal 
class. In other words, the training matrix has 25689 
columns where each column represents a 76×1 trace 
(pattern) vector. 
 
II. Compute the average trace vector c as follows: 
 
c =
t1+t2+…+t25689
25689
 
 
III. Compute the P matrix as follows: 
 
P = [t1 –c : t2 – c : … : t25689  – c] 
 
IV. Compute the covariance matrix Q as follows: 
Q=P𝐏𝐓, 
where Q has the dimensions of 76×76. 
 
V. Compute 76 eigenvectors ek, for k=1,2,…,76, of the 
covariance matrix Q and form the E matrix for 
training data set using all 76 eigenvectors as follows: 
E= [e1 : e2 : … : e76], 
  where E is a 76×76 matrix. 
 
VI. Project all trace vectors 𝐭𝑖, where i=1,2,…, 25689, in 
the training data set onto the Eigenspace                 
Strain ={zi,train}, which is a set of vectors, by computing 
its inner product with each of the eigenvectors in E as 
follows: 
zi,train = ET ti, 
     where zi,train is a 76×1 training vector for i=1,2,…, 
25689. 
 
Figure 1. Eigentraces procedure for training set generation 
 
The training Eigenspace forms the model for the target 
class. Evaluating the classification performance of this model 
is done through the testing set. ADFA-LD data set provides 
labeled normal and anomalous traces, which are preprocessed 
for feature extraction using the Eigentraces procedure. The 
procedure described in Figure 2 presents the formation and 
mapping of the testing set into the training Eigenspace. 
 
 
 
𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼5 𝛼6 𝛼7 𝛼8 𝛼9 𝛼10 
 
Now the window will shift to the right over this sequence 
by 5 numbers resulting in the pattern as below: 
 
 
𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼5 𝛼6 𝛼7 𝛼8 𝛼9 𝛼10 𝛼11 
 
 
Pattern 
Matrix 
Intended 
Use 
Pattern Class 
Membership 
Dimensions 
Dtraining Training Normal 76×25689 
Dtest Testing Normal/Attack 76×195890 
Table 1. Training and testing matrices. 
d = 6 
d = 6 
s =5 
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Eigentraces Methodology: Generation of Testing 
Template Set 
 
I. Form the normal and attack testing data into a matrix 
Dtest , where each trace is represented as a 76×1 vector 
ynormal,i, i=1,2,…,185196 for normal traces and yattack,j, 
j=1,2,…,10694 for attack traces as follows: 
 
Dtest = [y normal,1 : y normal,2 : … : y normal,185196 : yattack,1 : 
yattack,2 : … : yattack,10694]. 
 
II. Renumber the Dtest components as below: 
 
Dtest = [y1 ∶ y2 ∶ …: y185196 : y185197 ∶ …: y195890], 
 
where y
𝑗
 for j=1,2,…,185196 represents normal 
vectors and for j=185197,185198,…,195890 
represents attack vectors. 
 
III. Compute the inner product of each test trace vector y
𝑗
 
with training eigenvector matrix E. The resultant is a 
76×1 vector in the Eigenspace given by 
 
𝐯𝑗,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  E
Ty
j
 , 
 
where Stesting = {𝐯𝑗,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡}, for j=1,2,…,195890, 
represents the projection of test vectors onto the 
Eigenspace. 
 
Figure 2. Eigentraces procedure for testing set generation 
 
C. One-class classification (OCC) 
In most classification problems, the training dataset covers all 
the classes. However, in some cases, the training set contains 
just a single class labeled as the target.  In other words, the 
classifier must be induced using samples belonging to a single 
class although once the classifier is deployed, patterns or 
samples belonging to other classes which were not present in 
the training set may appear.  This type of learning problem is 
called one-class classification (OCC) [15]. The one-class 
classification is also called as outlier or novelty detection since 
the procedure is used to distinguish between the normal 
(target) and abnormal (anomalous or outlier) data with respect 
to the distribution of the training data that exclusively contain 
normal (target) samples.  
 There are two main approaches for the OCC reported in the 
literature. Pearson et al [16] suggested a density estimation 
based approach, through which a statistical distribution is 
fitted to the target data. In this methodology, the data points 
with low-density value are considered as outliers and 
belonging to the abnormal class. The difficulty with this 
approach is identifying a proper distribution function for the 
given instances which need to be chosen empirically. The 
other technique for OCC is based on generating artificial data 
[17] which makes it possible to apply binary/multi-class 
classification to the OCC problem.  Generating artificial data 
makes it possible to convert the OCC problem to the multi-
class problem which means the artificial data play the role of 
the second (abnormal) class. The approach entails formulating 
a decision boundary around the target (normal) data such that 
any data points, which fall outside of this boundary represent 
the outliers. This decision boundary also can be defined by 
existing multi-class learning classifiers [18]. Both of these 
OCC techniques depend on the values of various parameters 
which are chosen empirically, and their performance is highly 
sensitive to these parameter values.  
 In this study, the approach to address the OCC problem 
entails employing the standard two-class classification by 
generating artificial data to form the second (abnormal or 
anomaly) class.   The artificial data comes from a known 
reference distribution such as multi-variate distribution that 
can be estimated from the target class. The objective of 
learning associated with this method is to estimate class 
probability accurately rather than minimization of 
classification error. Accordingly, machine learners can be 
employed as probability modelers for calculating the class 
probability. Bagging, neural networks, support vector 
machines (SVM), and decision trees are among the choices for 
such modeling and are poised to yield good class probability 
estimation. The artificial data, which is associated with the 
second class label, need to be as close as possible to the target 
class data points to be able to fit the decision boundary around 
the target data as tightly as possible. One option adopts the 
Gaussian distribution as the reference distribution for the 
target class and then generates the artificial data from that. 
Thereafter, the target class probability function is computed 
using a machine learner, which is adapted for estimation, and 
finally, the target class density function is calculated using a 
derivation through the Bayes’ rule  [19]. 
 The Bayes’ rule estimates the probability of an event based 
on previous information. Formally stated, it computes the 
posterior probability of an event by taking prior probability 
and likelihood function into account as follows:  
 
 P(T|X) = 
P(X\T)P(T)
P(𝑋)
 (1) 
 
where the term P(T)  stands for the prior probability that 
estimates the probability of event T before the observed 
evidence X; the marginal likelihood P(𝑋) is the probability of 
each observed event; the likelihood P(X|T)  represents the 
probability of observing X given T; and the P(T|X) denotes the 
posterior probability, which is the probability of event T given 
the evidence X. 
 As it is shown in [15], one can use the Bayes’ theorem to 
compute the target class density function given target class 
prior probability, target class probability, and artificial class 
(reference) density. Redefinition of the parameters for Bayes’ 
equation for the study herein for one-class classification is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T: target class 
A: artificial class 
x: instance 
P(T): the prior probability of observing a 
target class instance 
P(𝑥): instance marginal likelihood 
P(T|x) : target class probability function 
P(x|A) : artificial class density function 
P(x|T) : target class density function 
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Since there are two classes, the probability of instance x equals 
to observing an instance of either target or artificial data. Thus, 
we have the following: 
 
 P(T|x) = 
P(x|T)P(T)
P(x|T)P(T) + P(x|A)P(A) 
 (2) 
 
Next step is to solve Equation 2 for P(X|T) that will be used 
for one-class classification and as the target class density 
function.  Consequently, further algebraic manipulation of 
Equation 2 as detailed in [13] leads to the following form: 
 
 P(x|T)= 
(1- P(T)) P(T|x)
P(T) (1- P(T|x)) 
 P(x|A) (3) 
 
Equation 3 combines the artificial class density P(x|A), class 
probability function P(T|x), and target class prior probability 
P(T) and therefore, facilitates the computation of the density 
function of the target class P(x|T). In order to estimate the 
P(x|A), we apply the Gaussian distribution to the target data 
with a mean value of 0 and the standard deviation value of 1. 
Hence, the probability density function of artificial data is 
given by 
 P(x|A)= 
1
√2πσ
exp [-
(x-μ
A
)
2
2σ2
] = 
1
√2π
exp [-
x2
2
] (4) 
 
Next, we generate artificial data from this distribution 
where the size of this artificial data is user-defined.  In order 
to have a balanced dataset, we generate the same amount of 
data which equals to target data set size. Therefore, the 
probability of P(T)  and P(A)  have the same value of 0.5.  
Accordingly, we simplify Equation 3 by eliminating P(T) and 
1- P(T) as follows: 
 P(x|T)= 
 P(T|x)
 (1- P(T|x)) 
 P(x|A) (5) 
 
where x is zi,train for i = 1,2,…,25689. Equation 5 computes the 
target density function during the training procedure that 
yields the distribution and probability of the target instances. 
It is also necessary to define, during the training phase, a 
decision boundary around the target data by imposing a 
threshold for the density function which is called the target 
rejection rate (TRR).  In order to classify a new test instance 
vtest using OCC, one can first compute its density value given 
T: 
 
 P(vtest|T)= 
 P(T|vtest)
 (1- P(T|vtestt )) 
 P(vtest|A) (6) 
 
Next step is to compare the value of P(vtest |T) with the 
threshold value based on the TRR to make a classification 
decision.  In the following section, we discuss the radial basis 
function neural network for probability density function 
estimation. 
 
D. Radial Basis Function Network (RBFN)  
A Radial Basis Function Network (RBFN) is an artificial 
neural network with three layers as input, hidden and output 
[20]. The RBFN in this study is used to model the target class 
probability function. For this purpose, the Gaussian Mixture 
Model (GMM) is employed [21]. GMM computes a single 
mixture distribution by a weighted linear combination of 
existing probability density functions. In other words, the 
mixture distribution is a weighted average of the individual 
components. An RBFN uses the radial basis function as the 
activation function for its hidden layer neurons. A radial basis 
function, although typically Gaussian in form, can also be 
multiquadric, inverse quadric, inverse multiquadric, 
polyharmonic, or thin-plate spline. In this study, we employ 
the Gaussian function. 
 The dimensionality of the input patterns dictates the number 
of neurons in the input layer.  The number of hidden layer 
neurons depends on the number of clusters in the input pattern 
space.  The number of neurons in the output layer depends on 
the number of classes (labels) in the dataset for classification 
problems while, for function approximation, the RBFN has 
only one output layer neuron with a linear activation function. 
The Gaussian radial basis function has two parameters, 
namely center (mean) and variance. Equation 7 represents this 
function: 
 ɸ𝑣= exp (- 
(x-𝛍𝑣)
2
2σ𝑣
2 )         v ϵ {1, 2, …, M},   (7) 
where the parameter μ is the center (vector); σ refers to the 
standard deviation which is calculated using the training 
samples: and (x-𝛍𝑣)
2
is the distance between the input vector 
x and the v-th center given that there are M centers. Suppose 
there are K input vectors x where each one has h features. In 
other words, x is an h-dimensional feature vector where each 
dimension is scalar-valued with M<<K. A clustering 
algorithm can be used to generate M clusters of the feature 
vectors.  Subsequently, the variance can be calculated using 
Equation 8: 
 
 σ2 = 
(maximum distance between any two centers)2
number of centers
. (8) 
 
The mapping function 𝑓 for i-th neuron at the output layer is 
defined as follows:  
 𝑓𝑖 =  ∑ wj
𝑚
j=1
 ɸ
𝑗
(𝐱)        𝑖 ϵ {1, 2, … , 𝐺},  (9) 
 
where there are G neurons in the output layer. 
 RBFN training generates M Gaussian distributions likely 
with different values for the two parameters, namely the center 
and the variance. Each of these distributions has a 
corresponding probability density function γ
v
(x)=N(x|μ
v
,σv
2). 
The resultant probability distribution is given by 
 
 
Ψ(x) = a1N(x | μ1,σ1
2) + a2N(x | μ2,σ2
2) + … + 
aMN(x | μM,σM
2 ) = ∑ avN(x | μv,σv
2)
𝑀
𝑣=1
, 
 
(10) 
where μ and σ are the parameters of distributions, M refers the 
number of Gaussian distributions (clusters), and ai, for 
i=1,2,…, M, is the weight given to each individual component.  
 As a multivariate Gaussian model, each distribution has 
three different parameters: these are the input vector x, the 
mean vector μ , and the covariance matrix Σ where each 
principal diagonal element is the variance σ2  of the random 
variable. In summary, if there are M components (Gaussian 
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distributions) and ɸ
v
 represents the component v, general 
GMM assumption is as follows: 
• Each component ɸ
v
 has a mean vector μ
v
. 
• Each component ɸ
v
 generates an instance from 
corresponding Gaussian distribution with mean μ
v
 and 
covariance matrix Σv. 
Considering given parameters, the GMM probability 
density function is defined as 
 
Ψ(x) = ∑ 𝑃(ɸ
v
)N(x | μ
v
,Σv),
𝑀
𝑣=1
 
 
(11) 
where 
𝑃(ɸ
v
)> 0, 𝑃(ɸ
1
) + 𝑃(ɸ
2
) + ⋯ + 𝑃(ɸ
M
) = 1, 
 
μ
v
= 
1
𝐾𝑣
 ∑ xi
𝐾𝑣
i=1 , and 
 
Σv=  
1
𝐾𝑣
∑ (x
i
-
𝐾𝑣
i=1
μ
v
)( xi-μv)
T, 
 
where Kv refers the total number of input vectors in cluster v 
where v=1,2,…,M. 
 Next step is to generate a cluster with a defined probability 
function using Expectation Maximization (EM) [22]. The EM 
algorithm has two steps. In step one, for each data point xi, it 
computes the probability that it belongs to the component ɸ
v
. 
Then it estimates the posterior probability under ɸ
v
 using 
Bayes’ rule: 
 𝑃(ɸ
𝑣
|xi) =  
𝑃(ɸ
v
)𝑃(xi|ɸ𝑣)
∑ 𝑃(ɸ
b
)𝑃(xi|ɸ𝑏)
m
b=1
 (12) 
where 𝑃(xi|ɸ𝑣)  = N(x|μv,Σv) , 𝑃(xi|ɸ𝑏) =  N(x|μb, Σb)  and 
the terms in the denominator must sum to 1.0.  In the second 
step, for each component, GMM updates its parameters using 
the weighted data points. Both steps will be repeated until 
convergence. Further details on various processes to optimize 
the parameter values are provided in [22]. 
 Consequently, an RBFN models input training data using 
Gaussian distributions through its hidden layer neurons; the 
GMM algorithm defines a mixture distribution of the entire 
training data, and the EM algorithm computes the target 
probability function for use in the proposed one-class 
classification framework. 
 
E. Random Forest  
Random Forest inductive learning algorithm [23] is an 
ensemble design [24-26] which employs decision trees as base 
learners and the divide-and-conquer approach to implement a 
high-performing learner. Given the set S with |S| data points x 
(instances) where x is an h-dimensional vector, divide |S| data 
points into C number of random subsets where each subset is 
used to induce one decision tree. Each decision tree 
independently makes a prediction and final prediction is based 
on the majority vote among all decision tree predictions.  
The procedure for the application of the random forest 
algorithm for training and testing is as follows: 
1) Generate C subtrees from training set S by iterating 
Bootstrap Aggregation (Bagging) C times. Bagging 
methodology generates these subtrees with replacement 
by uniformly sampling from S. Since, the replacement is 
allowed, some data samples might be used to induce one 
or more subtrees. 
2) Apply Random Subspace creation (attribute bagging) to 
generated subtrees. If each data point xi described by h 
features, attribute bagging randomly selects h’< h 
attributes and learns the decision tree [27]. 
3) The attribute, which results in the best split according to 
an objective function, will be used to do the split on that 
node. The h’ value is empirically set, however, Breiman 
[28] suggested three values as follows: 0.5√h  , 
√h   and 2√h . 
4) Repeat the same procedure with different h’ attributes: the 
iteration count value is user-defined. 
5) Each decision tree predicts the class of an instance 
independently and the consensus class, which is predicted 
the most often among the base learners, becomes the final 
decision. 
For inducing a decision tree as a base learner for Random 
Forest ensemble for a binary-class problem with two values as 
“positive” and “negative”, the root node is assigned the best 
attribute (see [29] how to choose the best attribute), which 
contains all instances. The process of tree induction continues 
by splitting the node for all possible attribute values and 
including entire instances with that attribute value in the 
corresponding child nodes. If all instances associated with a 
node result in positive (negative) class value, then it is called 
a pure node, where the tree development stops. As the leaves 
of a decision tree must be pure, splitting the non-pure node for 
its attribute values takes place again, which is followed by 
checking to see if any of the nodes are pure. At some point 
during the decision tree development as a base learner, if there 
is no attribute left and the leaf node has both positive and 
negative instances, the procedure for decision tree 
development must be repeated anew with different attributes 
assigned to the root and child nodes. 
 The class probability estimates for a given input pattern can 
be calculated based on the frequency of observed class values 
occurring at the leaves. The probability of class T being 
responsible for generating the instance 𝐱 in the subtree Sg  is 
calculated by the number of leaves resulting in class T divided 
by the total number of leaves:  
 
Pg(T|x) =  
Number of Leaves with Class Label T in Sg  
Total Number of Leaves in Sg 
, 
 
where x belongs to the union of training and testing sets, 
namely Straining = {zi,training} for i = 1,2,…,25689 and Stesting= 
{vj,test}, for i = 1 ,2,…,195890. 
In terms of an ensemble of several decision trees, one can 
use relative class frequency to define the class probability 
distribution by computing the average of the relative class 
frequencies of the forest sub-trees: 
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PForest(T|x) =  
1
C
 ∑ Pg (T|x) 
C
g=1
 
 
(14) 
Equation 14 yields the target class probability function.  
F. Threshold value computation  
In order to classify a new test instance vj,test, it is necessary 
first to assign a probability threshold for values computed 
using the estimated density function P(x|T) during the training 
procedure. Rejection sampling or acceptance-rejection 
method [30] is a type of Monte Carlo method that generates 
observations from a known distribution: it generates a 
proposal distribution from a given density function and 
performs uniformly random sampling from that proposed 
distribution. Thereafter, it rejects samples, which are not 
under the coverage of the original density function. We use 
the standard Gaussian distribution as the proposal distribution 
and run the rejection sampling process with given training 
vectors x  and corresponding target class density function 
P(x|T), where x represents the set of vectors defined by zi,training 
for i = 1, 2, … , 25689 in this study.  For a range of threshold 
values between 0.001 and 0.4, the Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) metric is calculated using both RBFN and Random 
Forest algorithms for estimating the target class probability 
function as it is shown in Figure 3.  The same figure shows 
AUC values are ascending for the true rejection rate (TRR) 
value range from 0.001 to 0.05 and descending for higher TRR 
values. Therefore, 0.05 is the optimum threshold value for 
probability density function based on the AUC values, which 
means any higher or lower value results in lower true positive 
rate or higher false negative rate. Thus, for any new instance 
vj,test, it  will be considered as an outlier if its value computed 
through the estimated probability density function given target 
class P(vj,test|T)  is less than 0.05. However, this is a data-
driven threshold which might vary across different datasets 
and should be estimated during the training process. 
III. Simulation Study 
We used MATLABTM  R2016a for data preprocessing and  
implementation of the Eigentraces methodology, and  WEKA 
3.9 one-class classifier package for classification. We 
considered both the RBFN and Random Forest as probability 
estimators for two separate studies. For RBFN, we generated 
5 clusters and assigned 0.1 as the minimum standard deviation 
of each cluster. For the Random Forest algorithm, the number 
of execution slots to use for constructing the ensemble is set 
as 1, and the number of randomly chosen attributes equals to 
log
2
76 ≈6. The value 76 refers to the number of attributes in 
our dataset. For the one-class classification toolset in Weka,  
Table 2 presents the user-settable parameters and their 
values. Classification performance measurements have been 
done through the CRAN package repository provided for the 
R programming framework. 
 
 
Figure 3. A trade-off between threshold and AUC values: 
the highest AUC value belongs to the threshold value of 0.05 
 
 
OCC Parameter Value 
numRepeates 10 
numericGenerator 
mean 
standardDeviation 
GMM 
0.0 
1.0 
percentageHeldout 10 
proportionGenerated 0.5 
targetRejectionRate 0.05 
 
Table 2.  WEKA one-class classifier parameter values 
 
Figures 4 and 5 present a summary highlight of training and 
testing procedures. 
A. Classifier development 
We used Gaussian density with a diagonal covariance matrix 
containing the observed variance of each attribute in the target 
(normal) data on the training templates to define the reference 
distribution. Using the reference distribution, we generated 
25689  artificial data points which collectively belong to 
artificial data set A and calculated P(zi,training |A). Then, we used 
two different algorithms separately, namely RBFN and 
Random Forest, to estimate the target class probability 
function. Finally, we combined the artificial class density 
function and target class probability function to calculate the 
target class density function with 10-fold cross-validation for 
validating the proposed function with the target rejection rate 
of 0.05.  
The accuracy of the decision boundary in this single class 
prediction is evaluated by the True Positive Rate (TPR), 
defined as the ratio of the number of correctly classified 
instances to the number of total instances of the target class.   
In other words, these values represent the rates for correctly 
classified target instances. AUC values as presented in Table 
3 are 98% for the RBFN and 95.1% for the Random Forest, 
which are high enough to employ in the testing process. 
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Figure 4. Training procedure flowchart 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Testing procedure flowchart 
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Probability Modeler RBFN 
Random 
Forest 
No of Instances 25689 25689 
Correctly Classified 25150 24433 
Misclassified 539 1256 
TPR 0.979 0.951 
FPR(FAR) 0.02 0.049 
AUC 0.98 0.951 
 
Table 3. Performance evaluation for the single target class 
 
B. Performance for unseen data 
We next evaluate the performance of the generated model by 
applying an external testing set, which consists of instances 
belonging to both normal and attack classes. The density 
function value of target class for each test instance, P(vtest|T), 
is calculated and compared with the threshold that is computed 
empirically during the training phase. If the value of P(vtest|T) 
is less than or equal to 0.05, the test instance vtest  will be 
considered as an anomaly; otherwise, it belongs to the target 
or normal class. We report the following four evaluation 
metrics to show the performance of the proposed method: 
 
Detection Rate (DR)= 
True Negatives 
 True Negatives + False Positives 
 
 
False Positive Rate (FPR)= 
False Positives
False Positives + True Negatives
 
 
False Alarm Rate (FAR)=
False Positive Rate (FPR) + False Negative Rate (FNR)
2
 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑇𝑃𝑅) + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑇𝑁𝑅)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
 
 
Table 4 shows the values of all four performance metrics 
while Table 5 presents the confusion matrices for both RBFN 
and Random Forest cases. As both of these tables indicate, the 
proposed method exhibits excellent performance.  The missed 
alarm rates are low as only 43 attacks are considered as normal 
for the RBFN and 71 attacks are considered normal for the 
Random Forest algorithm. 
C. Anomaly detection studies reported on ADFA-LD data 
set in the literature 
Literature abounds with studies about different types of two-
class anomaly-based intrusion detection systems for a variety 
of contexts such as host-based, network-based, and 
application-based and for various datasets.  A comparison 
with those studies that employed the ADFA-LD dataset for 
anomaly detection is presented next. 
Chawla et al.[31] proposed a combined convolutional 
neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN) 
model as an anomaly detection system using the ADFA-LD 
dataset. In their study, CNN layers capture the local 
correlations of structures in the system call traces and RNN 
layer learns the sequential correlations from the features. This 
model is trained on normal traces and predicted the probability 
distribution for the next system call in each trace. 
Accordingly, it predicts the probability for the entire trace, and 
imposing a threshold based on the range of the negative log-
likelihood, it classifies new traces into normal or abnormal 
class. This study reports the attack detection rate of 100% with 
a very high 60% false alarm rate. 
 
Probability 
Modeler 
RBFN Random Forest 
No of 
Instances 
Normal = 185196 
Attack =     10694 
Total =     195890 
Correctly 
Classified 
194217 193689 
Misclassified 1673 2201 
DR 0.996 0.993 
FPR 0.004 0.006 
FAR 0.006 0.009 
Accuracy 0.996 0.993 
 
Table 4. Model evaluation detailed performance metrics 
values 
 
 
Probability Modeler: RBFN 
Predicted As 
Normal Attack 
True Class 
Normal 183566 1630 
Attack 43 10651 
 
 
Probability Modeler:  
Random Forest 
Predicted As 
Normal Attack 
True Class 
Normal 183066 2130 
Attack 71 10623 
 
Table 5. Confusion matrices of for class probability 
estimators: RBFN and Random Forest 
Xie, et al. [32] used a short sequence method for feature 
extraction and formulation on the ADFA-LD dataset and 
applied one-class support vector machine (SVM) for 
multiclass classification. They reported 80% accuracy with 
false positive rate (FPR) of 15%. Using a frequency-based 
multiclass model, Xie, et al. [33] reduced the dimension of the 
dataset. They applied kNN and k-Means Clustering (kMC) 
algorithms for the detection of anomalies. Their main 
conclusion was that the kNN or KMC algorithms were not 
promising to detect anomaly attacks as their kMC 
implementation resulted in 60% accuracy with 20% FPR.   
Doyle III [34] created a frequency-based two-class model 
using N-grams method and leveraged the kNN and SVM to 
perform the classification and reported 60% accuracy. Haider 
et.al. employed the zero-watermark algorithm in two different 
studies. In their first study [35], they proposed a character data 
zero-watermark inspired statistical-based feature extraction 
strategy for integer data. They evaluated the performance of 
RBF kernel, SVM, and kNN classifiers on the binary class 
version of the anomaly detection problem. They reported 78% 
detection rate (DR) with 21% false alarm rate (FAR).  
All anomaly detection studies resulted in intrusion 
detection systems with lower-than-acceptable performance 
profiles. Table 5 represents a comparison between our study 
and others reported in the literature on the ADFA-LD dataset 
for anomaly detection. 
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Study Accuracy FPR DR FAR 
Chawla et al.[31] - - 1.00 0.60 
Xie, et al. [32] 0.80 0.15 - - 
Xie, et al. [33] 0.60 0.20 - - 
Doyle III [34] 0.60 - - - 
Haider, et.al. [35] - - 0.78 0.21 
RBFN 0.99 0.004 0.99 0.006 
Random Forest 0.99 0.006 0.99 0.009 
Table 6. Comparison with other anomaly detection studies 
on ADFA-LD dataset 
IV. Conclusion 
In this study, a semi-supervised host-based anomaly detection 
approach using one-class classification on ADFA-LD dataset 
has been proposed. A windowing method was implemented in 
order to generate equal-sized vectors of system call traces. A 
PCA-based methodology on the windowed trace data was 
employed to generate the trace templates or Eigentraces. 
Probabilistic modeling of the training data was accomplished 
through the Gaussian Mixtures and Expectation-
Maximization methods in conjunction with the Radial Basis 
Function Neural Network and Random Forest machine 
learners.  One-class classification through 10-fold cross-
validation was used for evaluating the anomaly detection 
performance. Performance evaluation employed a testing set 
which contained a large number of normal and anomalous 
instances. The proposed method demonstrated very high 
performance with respect to a multitude of benchmark metrics 
and comparative to other studies as reported in the literature 
on the same data set for anomaly detection. 
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